



University of Idaho

College of Engineering

ISAAC: THE IDAHO CPS SMART GRID

CYBERSECURITY TESTBED

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INTRODUCTION

A WORLD OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

- I Critical infrastructure such as the electric power grid provides real-time data processing from local or remote locations.
- I Increase in newer cyberphysical system (CPS) feature mechanisms.
- I Digitalized movements and automation advancements.
- I Convergence of Information Tech and Operational Tech networks

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM

I Smart grids are a vital part of critical infrastructure.

I Modern SCADA networks are prone to cyber attacks.

- Lack of tools to implement verifiable security.
- Legacy insecure devices are still in use.
- Enhanced exposure and vulnerability with increased connectivity

CHALLENGE

SECURING CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

To create a secure and resilient CPS:

- I Testing and validation in a real world environment.
- I Difficult or Impossible to test in a real environment.
- I Fully simulated tests may not provide accurate results.
 - Complex and real time interactions.
 - Device characteristics and vulnerabilities.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

REALISTIC CPS TESTBED

To emulate real-world-like vulnerability scenarios :

- I A Testbed that can fully represent a CPS organization.
 - Hardware-in-the-loop, not just hardware-simulation.
 - Enable small-scale but real experiments.

IDAHO CPS SCADA CYBERSECURITY TESTBED (ISAAC)

- I Adaptive and reconfigurable smart grid testbed.
- I Consists of real automation controllers along with:
 - IEDs, PMUs, SCADA software, analytics platforms etc.
- I Models emulate smart grid power system cases.
- I Enable real vulnerability assessment.
- I Enable Mitigation development
- I Facilitates cybersecurity research and education.

CHALLENGES

- I Funding: State of Idaho, MJ Murdock.
- I Team: build multidisciplinary team (Faculty, staff).
- I Usable security and safety.

ISAAC SYSTEM COMPONENTS



I Power lab Testbed (PoT):

- RTDS, 4 small Substations, SDN switch, firewall, PMU, GPS clock, RTAC, relay and other control devices.


I Reconfigurable Attack-Defend Instructional Computing Laboratory (RADICL):

- Computing environment for forensics and penetration testing.



I Securing Cyberphysical systems ANalytics, Visualization, IoT, and machine Learning Laboratory of Enquiry (SCANVILLE)

- Analytics and Visualization
- Hybrid: Control and Cyber views.


ISAAC: BLOCK DIAGRAM



POWER LAB TESTBED





DATA FLOW




RESILIENCE RESEARCH DATAFLOW DIAGRAM


EXAMPLE SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM



RADICL



- I** Blue: Teaching, non-attack zone
- I** Red: Penetration testing tools
- I** Purple: Infrastructure zone




Visualization



SCADA HMI









Security Analytics




Security Visualization



SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

-  Testbed airgap and isolation
-  Security policies and procedure
-  Virtualization technologies
-  Node re-imaging
-  Network encryption using MACSec
-  Planned security assessment

ISAAC: OVERALL ARCHITECTURE



ISAAC's Logical Connectivity

CURRENT PROGRESS

PROGRESS IN PROJECT ISAAC



I Power lab testbed is fully implemented.

I SCANVILLE and RADICL are also fully functional.

I Some current projects:

- Resiliency and risk assessment of CPS
- Detection of stealth attacks against state estimation
- Machine learning based situational awareness.

EXAMPLE ISAAC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT



EXAMPLE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

I Network reconnaissance.

- Helps in understanding the network topology.
- Replay attacks from captured packets.

I Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning.

- Man-in-the-middle attack.
- Network compromised with false data measurements.






FUTURE WORK

NOT SO FUTURE...(ONGOING)

- I Integration to University of Idaho facilities in Idaho Falls and Coeur d'Alene using Idaho Regional Optical Network (IRON).
- I Further policy and process development

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THANK YOU

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THANK YOU!

QUESTIONS & FEEDBACK

I Glad to collaborate

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